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Abstract—This paper analyzes the regulatory factors shaping environmen-
tal performance at individual polluting facilities. In particular, it examines
the influence of actual government interventions, namely, inspections and
enforcement actions performed at specific facilities. This influence repre-
sents specific deterrence. This paper also examines general deterrence,
that is, the threat of receiving an intervention. As important, it controls for
differences in certain regulatory features of facility-specific pollution
control permits. Unlike previous attempts to examine regulatory factors,
this analysis uses panel data techniques to capture the heterogeneity across
individual facilities, while exploring the dynamics of each facility; the
analysis also captures heterogeneity across individual time periods.
I. Introduction
RECENTLY the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) has been expressing a strong interest in under-
standing better the factors that shape environmental perfor-
mance at individual polluting facilities. In particular, the
EPA wishes to assess the effectiveness of government in-
terventions, such as inspections and enforcement actions. To
inform these interests, this paper analyzes the regulatory
factors that shape the level of environmental performance at
individual water-polluting facilities. For this purpose, I
measure environmental performance by the level of waste-
water discharges relative to the permitted effluent limits. In
this way, I examine levels of both noncompliance and
overcompliance. The primary research objective is to assess
the effectiveness of government interventions for inducing
better performance. For this purpose, I consider various
government interventions: (1) federal inspections, (2) state
inspections, (3) federal penalties, and (4) state penalties.
This examination of government interventions captures
deterrence in two forms. Specific deterrence involves re-
sponses to interventions imposed on a specific facility.
General deterrence involves responses to the threat of re-
ceiving an intervention. As important, this paper controls for
differences in certain regulatory features of facility-specific
water pollution control permits (for example, limit levels).
To analyze the effects of these regulatory factors on envi-
ronmental performance, this particular empirical analysis
examines the wastewater discharges by large municipal
wastewater treatment facilities in the state of Kansas for the
years 1990 to 1998, which represents a very limited scope
for analysis. Unlike all previous studies of environmental
performance (or behavior), this paper uses panel data anal-
ysis to explore heterogeneity across individual facilities and
individual time periods.1 For this purpose, the paper uses
these econometric models: pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS), one-way and two-way fixed-effects models, and
one-way and two-way random-effects models.
Economic analysis on the effects of regulatory factors on
environmental performance and behavior is limited (Cohen,
1999). Few economic studies analyze the effects of govern-
ment interventions on facility environmental performance
involving standard emissions, and they focus solely on two
industrial sectors—pulp/paperboard and steel (Gray &
Deily, 1996; Magat & Viscusi, 1990; Nadeau, 1997;
Laplante & Rilstone, 1996; Helland, 1998a, 1998b).2 In the
realm of wastewater management, previous studies examine
only the former sector and consider only the effects of
government inspections. The only studies of enforcement
actions are in the realm of air emission management. Only
two studies examine the effects of regulatory pressure on
environmental behavior (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996; Das-
gupta, Hettige, & Wheeler, 2000). No previous study exam-
ines the effects of permit conditions on environmental
performance or behavior.
Other studies examine the effects of nonregulatory fac-
tors, such as community pressure, on environmental perfor-
mance (for example, Pargal & Wheeler, 1996; Arora &
Cason, 1996).
None of these cited studies use panel data analysis to
capture the influence of regulatory or nonregulatory factors
on environmental performance or behavior.3
This present study draws upon these previous analyses to
contribute to the literature in the following ways. First and
foremost, this paper uses panel data analysis to assess the
influence of regulatory factors and to explore heterogeneity
across individual facilities and time periods. In particular,
this paper demonstrates a strong heterogeneity across indi-
vidual facilities and links this feature to critical facility
characteristics. Second, this study analyzes the extent of
noncompliance and overcompliance, which provides greater
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1 Heterogeneity across facilities stems from factors such as different
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2 Other similar studies focus exclusively on agency behavior regarding
inspections and/or enforcement actions (e.g., Deily & Gray, 1991; Earn-
hart, 1997, 2000a, 2000b).
3 Some studies perform only cross-sectional analysis (Arora & Cason,
1996; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Pargal & Wheeler, 1996; Henriques &
Sadorsky, 1996). Other studies utilize a panel data set while ignoring the
data structure of repeated observations on individual facilities (Magat &
Viscusi, 1990; Helland, 1998a, 1998b; Nadeau, 1997; Gray & Deily, 1996;
Laplante & Rilstone, 1996).
The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2004, 86(1): 391–401
© 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
differentiation across polluters’ performance.4 Third, this
study comprehensively incorporates regulatory factors.
Fourth, this study analyzes a new category of polluter:
municipal wastewater treatment plants, which are all pub-
licly owned in Kansas. This type of polluter demands
research attention in that municipal plants may not be
effectively controlled by federal or state regulators. For
example, public polluters are seldom the target of enforce-
ment action by enforcement agencies (Naysnerski & Tieten-
berg, 1992). Yet, municipal plants represent one of the two
main categories of polluters controlled by the Clean Water
Act, and are 57% of all large wastewater dischargers.5 As
important, the federal government has strongly demon-
strated, in the form of financial assistance, its desire to limit
wastewater discharges by municipal plants.6 Presumably the
federal government would be interested in assessing the
effectiveness of using government interventions to maintain
a good return on its investment. Nevertheless, as with other
studies that focus on one industry, the results of the present
study most likely will not generalize to all industries.
II. Empirical Application
A. Selection of Research Site
To examine the effectiveness of government interventions
and the influence of regulatory factors in general, this paper
examines a specific demonstration of environmental perfor-
mance: biological oxygen demand (BOD) wastewater dis-
charges by large (“major” ) municipal wastewater treatment
plants in Kansas during the years 1990 to 1998. This
selection is appropriate for several reasons. First, unlike
other media, regulators systematically record wastewater
discharges and limits. Second, during the 1990s, Kansas had
the dubious honor of suffering the worst ambient surface
water quality in the entire United States.7 Third, the EPA
and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment
(KDHE), the state environmental agency, focus their regu-
latory efforts on EPA-classified “major” facilities.8 Munic-
ipal facilities represent 42 of the 58 major facilities in
Kansas. Fourth, BOD represents the main type of pollutant
discharged by municipal facilities.9 Although this sample
generates a large data set (4,320 observations) on environ-
mental performance, it is very limited in scope.10
B. Government Regulatory Influence
Government efforts to control water pollution begin with
the issuance of facility-specific permits. Although the EPA
possesses the authority to issue permits, this authority has
been delegated to states that meet federal criteria. Permits
are issued generally on a 5-year cycle. Within a 5-year
permit, agencies may impose interim limits, which serve as
a transition to the final limits, which are generally more
stringent. Or agencies may impose final limits immediately.
The specific limit levels are based solely on effluent limi-
tation guidelines promulgated by the EPA (40 CFR Part
133) and concerns over the ambient quality of the receiving
waterbody.11 To ensure compliance with issued permits, the
EPA and relevant state agencies periodically inspect facili-
ties and take enforcement actions as needed. Although the
EPA retains authority to monitor and penalize facilities,
state agencies are primarily responsible for monitoring and
enforcement.
C. Data Collection
To examine the effects of these regulatory factors—
permit conditions, inspections, and enforcement ac-
tions—on the environmental performance of Kansas munic-
ipal wastewater treatment facilities, I gather data from
various databases. From the EPA’s Permit Compliance Sys-
tem (PCS) database, I draw the following attributes for each
facility: (1) permit issuance dates; (2) type of emission
limit: interim or final; (3) flow capacity (millions of gallons/
day); (4) type of treatment technology: secondary (for
example, activated sludge) versus secondary equivalent (for
4 The simple distinction between compliance and noncompliance is too
limited in that many facilities overcomply with effluent limits (see, for
example, Helland, 1998a). [McClelland and Horowitz (1999) report that
aggregate emissions from pulp and paper plants in 1992 were roughly
50% of the permitted emissions.] Analysis of emissions without reference
to limits is too limited in that it ignores variation in limits across facilities
and time (see, for example, Helland, 1998b). Only Laplante and Rilstone
(1996) consider emissions relative to limits.
5 In 1990, municipal plants represented approximately 15,000 of the
roughly 64,000 wastewater dischargers, almost 25% of the total (EPA,
1990); in 1994, municipal plants represented 57% of the 7,053 large
dischargers.
6 Between 1972 and 2001, the federal government issued more than $77
billion in grants and loans to municipal plants (Revkin, 2002).
7 The Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) took
limited steps to improve water quality in the 1990s by updating state water
quality criteria (KDHE, 1994). The EPA also evaluated these water quality
criteria in 1997 (Hall and Associates, 1997).
8 Major facilities meet one of three criteria: (1) possess a discharge flow
of 1 million gallons per day, (2) serve a population of 10,000 or greater,
or (3) cause significant impact on the receiving waterbody.
9 BOD is one of the five EPA-classified conventional pollutants, which
are the focus of EPA control efforts. The EPA considers BOD the most
damaging of the conventional pollutants and the focus of its control efforts
(Helland, 1998a). All previous wastewater studies but one focus exclu-
sively on BOD. Because technologies controlling BOD tend to reduce
other pollutants, the relationship between regulatory factors and BOD
emissions ought to be similar to the relationship between these factors and
other pollutants (Magat & Viscusi, 1990).
10 Being focused on one state, the results most likely will not generalize
to all states; however, this tight focus should help to improve the accuracy
of the analysis by avoiding the need to control for differences across
states, especially the differences in state agency regulatory approaches.
Being focused on wastewater and large facilities, the results need not
generalize to all types of environmental performance and facilities of all
sizes.
11 Federal regulations establish upper bounds on limit levels. (Agencies
may violate these federal standards by issuing higher limits. Only 0.5% of
the Kansas data involve higher limits.) State agencies may legally issue
more stringent effluent limits to maintain specific uses of particular
waterways, such as fishing (EPA, 1990). In particular, the KDHE issues
more stringent limits based on a state water quality standard for dissolved
oxygen, which represents the ambient water quality parameter equivalent
to the BOD pollutant.
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example, stabilization ponds);12 (5) BOD monthly emission
limit levels; and (6) BOD monthly discharges. I calculate
relative emissions by dividing discharges by the emissions
limit. Thus, lower relative emissions reveal better perfor-
mance.
From the PCS database, I also draw data on inspections
performed by federal and state regulators within the state of
Kansas. From these data, I generate separate measures of
federal and state, specific and general deterrence, as de-
scribed below.
From the EPA Docket and KDHE enforcement databases,
I draw data on formal enforcement actions imposed against
Kansas water polluters.13 From these data, I create separate
measures of federal and state, specific and general deter-
rence, as described below.
From the Commerce Department Regional Economic
Information Service (REIS) database, I gather annual data
on county-level community characteristics: sales taxes and
population.
For two of the 42 facilities, these databases provide
severely limited information, especially on BOD limits and
emissions. Consequently, I eliminate these two facilities
from the sample.
D. Statistical Summary
Table 1 provides a statistical summary of the collected
data used for the regression analysis. The average facility
has the capacity to discharge approximately 6 million gal-
lons per day. Over 90% of the facilities employ secondary
treatment. Facilities face interim limits approximately 4%
of the time. In any given month, the average permit has been
expired for almost 194 days. The average BOD emission
limit is slightly below 30 mg/L. Though facilities face a
12 The approval process for a facility’s particular technology is highly
technical and case by case.
13 Formal actions include consent orders, corrective actions, remediation
requirements, and fines.
TABLE 1.—STATISTICAL SUMMARY
A. Regression Variables
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev.
Secondary equivalent treatment 0, 1 0.075 0.263
Flow capacity Million gallons/day 6.301 8.695
Sales taxes $1,000 48,747 75,084
Population Millions 0.108 0.132
Monthly effluent limit level mg/L 29.609 3.952
Permit expiration 1,000 days 0.194 0.403
Final limit type 0, 1 0.953 0.212
Nonreporting of effluent limit 0, 1 0.053 0.224
BOD relative emissions Ratio 0.476 0.446
Log of BOD relative emissions Log of ratio 1.079 0.792
Nonreporting of emissions 0, 1 0.024 0.152
Winter season 0, 1 0.25 0.433
Spring season 0, 1 0.25 0.433
Summer season 0, 1 0.25 0.433
EPA inspection in current month 0, 1 0.036 0.040
KDHE inspection in current month 0, 1 0.102 0.049
Preceding 12-month cumulative KDHE inspections Count 1.214 0.764
Preceding 12-month cumulative EPA inspections Count 0.388 0.652
KDHE or EPA one-year lagged penalty 0, 1 0.031 0.174
Predicted KDHE inspection probability Probability 0.098 0.048
Predicted EPA inspection probability Probability 0.029 0.031
Annual KDHE enforcement of KS facilities Count 4.750 3.382
Annual EPA enforcement of KS facilities Count 1.750 2.488
B. Annual Number of Enforcement Actions Taken against Kansas Facilities
Year EPA Actions KDHE Actions
1990 0 5
1991 0 0
1992 1 5
1993 0 6
1994 0 9
1995 0 10
1996 1 5
1997 6 2
1998 6 1
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30-mg/L a large majority of the time, limit levels vary
across facilities, across years, and within years. This varia-
tion confirms the need to examine relative emissions.14 In
the average month, facilities face a 4% chance of an EPA
inspection and a 10% chance of a state inspection.
Table 1B demonstrates the progression of enforcement
over the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1998 inclusive, the EPA
imposed 14 penalties against Kansas facilities; only one
applied to a major municipal facility. The KDHE imposed
43 penalties, 10 of which applied to major municipal facil-
ities. Given the limited number of EPA penalties against
major municipal facilities, this analysis cannot effectively
distinguish between the specific deterrence effects of federal
enforcement and state enforcement. Instead, it merges these
two enforcement categories when examining specific deter-
rence.
Finally, consider relative emission levels. Facilities on
average overcomply with the BOD average limit by 52%.
On the other hand, BOD relative emissions surge as high as
1,453% above the permitted limits. These figures confirm
the need to analyze the degree of compliance and noncom-
pliance rather than the status of compliance versus noncom-
pliance.
Section III structures the econometric analysis of these
collected data, including the creation of measures to capture
specific and general deterrence. Section IV displays the
analytical results.
III. Econometric Approach
A. Regression Model
This paper analyzes the effects of regulatory factors,
including government interventions, on environmental per-
formance. Toward this end, it estimates environmental per-
formance, which stems from decisions made by treatment
plants, and government interventions, which represent de-
cisions made by agencies. I define these decision variables
with the following notation. Let Yit denote the level of
relative emissions for facility i in time period t. Let Iit
EPA
indicate the decision by the EPA to inspect facility i in time
period t: Iit
EPA  {0,1}. Let Iit
KD indicate the decision by the
KDHE to inspect facility i in time period t: Iit
KD  {0,1}. Let
Sit indicate the decision by the EPA or KDHE to impose a
sanction on facility i in time period t: Sit  {0,1}.
To estimate the effect of interventions on performance, I
must first sort out specific and general deterrence. Previous
studies of specific deterrence examine the contemporaneous
or lagged effect of a specific intervention at a specific
facility (Magat & Viscusi, 1990; Helland, 1998a, 1998b).
Previous studies of general deterrence examine the threat of
intervention at a particular facility. To capture this threat,
some studies use aggregate measures of government inter-
ventions within specified locations and time periods (for
example, Epple & Visscher, 1984; Cohen, 1987). Similar
studies focus directly on changes in the threat of an inter-
vention (for example, Olson, 1999). In particular, Stafford
(2002) examines the effect of a new EPA enforcement
protocol regarding hazardous waste by analyzing facility
compliance before and after the change. To capture the
threat of an intervention directly, other studies use the
predicted probability of an intervention (Laplante & Ril-
stone, 1996; Gray & Deily, 1996).
Consistent with previous studies, to capture specific de-
terrence, I focus on specific interventions at specific facili-
ties. Facilities may be able to respond to interventions
within the month of the intervention. In this case, perfor-
mance and interventions are determined simultaneously.
However, facilities most likely need several weeks, if not
months, to respond to interventions (Magat & Viscusi,
1990). Therefore, I use lagged, not current, values of inter-
ventions to capture specific deterrence.15 In the case of
inspections, I generate the cumulative count of inspections
performed by the KDHE at a specific facility in the preced-
ing 12-month period, which I denote as Ci t12
KD , and I
generate the cumulative count of inspections performed by
the EPA, which I denote as Ci t12
EPA .16 In the case of enforce-
ment, I use the 1-year-lagged indicator of a state or federal
sanction, which I denote as Si t12.
To capture general deterrence, I focus on the threat of an
intervention. I denote the threat of an EPA sanction and of
a KDHE sanction as SLit
EPA and SLit
KD, respectively, and
denote the threat of an EPA inspection and of a KDHE
inspection as ILit
EPA and ILit
KD, respectively. I capture these
threats differently for sanctions and inspections. For en-
forcement, I generate two variables that separately measure
the annual count of sanctions against all Kansas facilities by
the KDHE and EPA, respectively.17 For inspections, I pre-
dict their probability. Because these decisions are dichoto-
mous, I employ a probit model to estimate each inspection
decision separately (Maddala, 1983), as shown in the ap-
pendix.18
14 The PCS database contains no information on emission limits for
approximately 5% of the observations. Rather than dropping these obser-
vations, the empirical analysis adjusts for this lack of recorded limits by
setting the level of relative emissions to the sample mean and including a
dummy variable that indicates this alteration. The coefficient on this
regressor is always statistically insignificant. Separate analysis of obser-
vations with recorded emission limits generates highly similar results.
15 Within an instrumental variables approach for resolving potential
simultaneity between performance and interventions, lagged interventions
serve as proper instruments for current interventions, because lagged
interventions are exogenous to current performance (Laplante & Rilstone,
1996; Magat & Viscusi, 1990). Thus, the assumed connection between
lagged interventions and current performance need not be troubling.
16 I chose a period of 12 months for various reasons: (1) major polluters
should be inspected once per year, (2) the 12-month period fits with the
annual recording of enforcement actions, (3) other time periods generate
less significant results, and (4) Laplante and Rilstone (1996) examine a
12-month period.
17 Conversations with KDHE and EPA officials confirm that aggregate
measures of interventions properly proxy the threat of an intervention. Use
of inspection aggregate measures generates unsatisfying results.
18 I do not use the predicted probability of an enforcement action to
proxy for the threat of enforcement. Probit estimation of the government
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Regardless of the proxy for capturing an intervention
threat, general deterrence does not meaningfully depend on
current facility performance. The annual number of penal-
ties imposed against all Kansas facilities is practically
independent of a particular facility’s performance. As well,
the predicted probability of an intervention is based on past,
not current, performance, as argued below.19
To support this last argument, I turn to agency behavior.
First, although current interventions may depend on current
performance, it is highly doubtful that agencies are cogni-
zant of a facility’s performance in the very month chosen for
intervention. Agencies more likely base their intervention
decisions on past performance, because they need time to
evaluate performance before responding to it (Magat &
Viscusi, 1990). In this case, performance and interventions
are not simultaneously determined. Instead, lagged perfor-
mance is predetermined relative to current interventions. To
capture lagged performance, I use the mean level of relative
emissions in the preceding 3-month period, Y̆i t3.20
Second, current KDHE inspections and EPA inspections
may be simultaneously determined. To resolve this potential
simultaneity, I employ an instrumental variables approach.
As the instrumental variable for current KDHE inspections,
I use preceding 12-month cumulative KDHE inspections at
a specific facility, Ci t12
KD . As the instrumental variable for
current EPA inspections, I use the similar count for EPA
inspections, Ci t12
EPA . Both lagged values are exogenous to
their current counterparts. This approach is proper in that
agencies most likely need time to respond to each other.
Third, current inspections and sanctions may be deter-
mined simultaneously. To resolve this potential simultane-
ity, I again employ an instrumental variables approach. As
the instrumental variables for KDHE inspections and EPA
inspections, I use the respective lagged cumulative inspec-
tions. This approach is appropriate due to the sequential
nature of enforcement: the regulator first inspects a facility,
then later sanctions it. As the instrumental variable for
current sanctions, I use the 1-year-lagged value of sanctions.
Given the sequential nature of enforcement, one may not
expect a connection from current enforcement to current
inspections. However, after sanctioning a facility, the regu-
lator may be more prone to inspect that same facility in the
future (Harrington, 1988).
The described decision variables—Yit, Iit
EPA, Iit
KD, and
Sit—represent the endogenous variables in the regression
system. Let Xit represent the vector of nondeterrence vari-
ables that determine performance. Zit represents the vector
of remaining variables that determine inspection decisions.
Mit represents the vector of remaining variables that deter-
mine enforcement actions. The following set of equations
captures the full regression system:
fYit  
EPACi t12
EPA KDCi t12
KD  SSi t12
 EPAILit
EPAKDILit
KDEPASLit
EPA
 KDSLit
KD  Xit  	Yit,
(1)
Iit
EPA  
 Y̆i t3  Ci t12
KD  Si t12   Zit  	Eit, (2)
Iit
KD Y̆i t3   Ci t12
EPA   Si t12   Zit  	Kit, (3)
Sit   Y̆i t3   C i t12
EPA   Ci t12
KD   Mit  	Sit,
(4)
where Yit, Eit, Kit, and Sit are error terms. For
equation (1), I present estimates from a semilog specifica-
tion, f(Yit)  ln Yit,21 using OLS regression.22
B. Panel Data Structure
The econometric analysis also addresses the panel struc-
ture of the collected data on environmental performance.
Most important, the analysis uses panel data models to
exploit the data along two dimensions: (1) heterogeneity
across polluters and (2) heterogeneity across time periods.
The analysis utilizes two specific standard panel data
models: the fixed-effects model and the random-effects
model (Hsiao, 1986). Each specific model stems from a
more general model that captures differences across the
various polluters by incorporating an individual term for
each facility. If it is uncorrelated with the other regressors in
equation (1), then a random-effects model is appropriate.
The one-way random-effects model captures differences
across the various polluters by including a random distur-
bance term that remains constant through time and captures
the effects of excluded factors specific to each facility. The
two-way random effects model captures differences across
time periods by additionally including a random disturbance
decision to take either a federal or a state enforcement action generates a
very poor fit to the data; thus, the predicted probability serves as a very
poor proxy, as noted in the appendix.
19 Some previous studies use predicted probabilities of government
interventions as instrumental variables within a two-stage simultaneous
equations model that avoids potential simultaneity between performance
and interventions (see, for example, Laplante & Rilstone, 1996; Gray &
Deily, 1996).
20 If current facility performance is determined simultaneously with
government interventions, then fortunately the summary lagged value of
relative emissions serves as a good instrumental variable in any instru-
mental variable approach, because the lagged value is exogenous with
respect to current interventions.
21 This paper also estimates a linear specification: f(Yit)  Yit. Based on
a goodness-of-fit measure—adjusted R2—and the prevalence of signifi-
cant coefficients, I chose the semilog specification as the better model. The
use of log values for the dependent variable also minimizes the effect of
outliers (Gray & Deily, 1996).
22 Legally all facilities must submit monthly discharge reports. This
self-monitoring is the most important source of information utilized by
regulators to assess environmental performance (EPA, 1990). [Stiff pen-
alties for false reports and periodic inspections provide incentives to report
discharges honestly (Magat & Viscusi, 1990).] However, the analysis must
address the fact that all facilities do not always submit reports. It tackles
this problem in four ways. Because the regression results are robust to the
various approaches, I report only one set of results. For the reported
approach, I fill the missing data on emissions with appropriate replace-
ment values (Laplante & Rilstone, 1996). In this study, I use facility-
specific annual mean values as replacements.
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term that is generic to all polluters but captures the effects
of excluded factors specific to each time period.
If the facility-specific term is correlated with the other
regressors in equation (1), then a fixed-effects model is
appropriate. The one-way fixed-effects model captures dif-
ferences across facilities by estimating a constant term for
each facility. The two-way fixed effects model captures
differences across time periods by additionally estimating
an individual constant term for each time period.
The next section uses these econometric models to ex-
amine the effects of regulatory factors.
IV. Estimation Results
A. Explanatory Variables
The analysis uses certain regressors to estimate environ-
mental performance. Flow capacity permits identification of
economies and/or diseconomies of scale. The type of treat-
ment technology captures the general character of a facili-
ty’s abatement technology. Sales taxes proxy for a commu-
nity’s level of resources available for wastewater treatment.
Population proxies for the volume of wastewater being
processed. The permit limit type, permitted limit level, and
permit expiration capture permit conditions.23 Lastly, I in-
clude the noted specific and general deterrence variables.
(The full set of regressors is shown in Table 1A.)
B. Pooled OLS Estimation of Environmental Performance
In this subsection, I report and interpret the pooled OLS
estimation results, shown in table 2. First, the effect of flow
capacity indicates that larger facilities significantly under-
perform smaller facilities; that is, BOD treatment involves
diseconomiesofscale.Second, facilitiesoperatingsecondary-
equivalent treatment technologies significantly underper-
form facilities operating secondary treatment technologies.
Given their very large t-statistics, these two factors must be
very important for explaining performance. Further analysis
demonstrates that they prove critical for assessing the ef-
fects of certain regulatory factors. Third, facilities holding
an expired permit significantly underperform those facilities
holding a valid permit, and this underperformance grows as
expiration increases. Perhaps facilities read the regulatory
laxness involving permit issuance as a sign of regulatory
laxness in general.24 Fourth, facilities facing a final limit
significantly outperform facilities facing only an interim
limit; thus, the stringency of final limits improves perfor-
mance. Fifth, more stringent limit levels undermine perfor-
mance, as shown by the significantly negative effect of
effluent limit levels.25
Finally, I examine deterrence. Both federal and state
inspection-related specific deterrence improve performance,
according to the effects of EPA and KDHE lagged cumula-
tive inspections. However, only the latter effect is signifi-
cant. Enforcement-related specific deterrence also signifi-
cantly improves performance. As for general deterrence, the
effects of predicted inspections demonstrate that the threat
of federal and state inspections significantly improves en-
vironmental performance. Enforcement-related general de-
terrence also significantly improves performance, based on
the effects of aggregate EPA and KDHE enforcement mea-
sures.
However, because these aggregate measures of enforce-
ment possess no cross-sectional variation, they are vulner-
able to changes in important yet unmeasured factors.26 To
mitigate this concern, I could argue that important unmea-
sured factors, such as other regulatory pressures and abate-
ment technology, changed little. Over the sample period,
the state of Kansas implemented no regulatory programs
relating to the observed environmental performance. As
important, very few facilities upgraded their abatement
technologies, according to KDHE officials, and no facility
changed its general technology. Still, I cannot rule out these
factors’ effects, especially given the time pattern of envi-
ronmental performance, which I demonstrate by including
individual year indicators in the regression, while excluding
enforcement-related general deterrence factors.27 As shown
in the second column of table 2, the indicators collectively
demonstrate a strong pattern of improving performance over
the sample period. Enforcement-related general deterrence
seems to explain some portion of this environmental perfor-
mance pattern, especially when the two measures are examined
jointly. As shown in Table 1B, increased state enforcement
seems to help explain improved performance during the first
half of the 1990s, and increased federal enforcement seems to
help explain improved performance during the last 2 years
of the sample period. However, the two enforcement mea-
sures could be merely picking up a baseline trend of im-
provement in facility performance. Thus, the reader should
view the estimation results relating to enforcement-related
general deterrence as merely suggestive.
23 I do not lag the effects of permit conditions, because they are easily
anticipated by facilities.
24 One might expect permit expiration and environmental performance
to be jointly determined. Facilities that expect to perform more poorly
may more strongly stall the issuance of new permits expected to contain
more stringent limits. Though facilities’ objections certainly explain some
of the cases of permit expiration, according to KDHE officials other
reasons explain most of these cases. For example, the EPA and Kansas
State Legislature objected to new state surface water quality standards,
which tied up many permits. Most important, the KDHE was short on
manpower. Still, I cannot rule out the possibility of joint determination.
25 One might expect limit levels and environmental performance to be
jointly determined. Facilities that expect to perform more poorly may
bargain more strongly for weaker limits. Though I cannot rule out this
possibility, analysis demonstrates that lagged performance does not seem
to affect limit levels and the highly limited variation in limit levels would
seem to mitigate any concern of joint determination.
26 Although this vulnerability is certainly problematic, it need not be
fatal. Recent studies of general deterrence effectively employ similar
aggregate-based measures (Stafford, 2002; Olson, 1999).
27 The other coefficients and standard errors remain mostly unchanged.
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C. One-Way Panel Data Models
Random Effects: Although the pooled OLS model gener-
ates solid and interesting results, it disregards the expected
heterogeneity inherent in the panel data. To exploit the
heterogeneity across individual facilities, I turn to one-way
panel data models. If appropriate, the one-way random
effects model is preferred to the one-way fixed-effects
model, which precludes estimation of two key yet time-
invariant factors: flow capacity and treatment technology.
TABLE 2.—REGRESSION OF BOD RELATIVE EMISSIONS: POOLED OLS AND RANDOM-EFFECTS MODELS
Variable
Pooled OLS
Random-Effects Models
One-Way
Two-Way
ModelModel 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.091 0.007 0.231 0.325* 0.241
(0.130) (0.133) (0.195) (0.196) (0.195)
Nonreporting of emissions 0.381*** 0.404*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.176***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
Winter season 0.222*** 0.267*** 0.105*** 0.123*** 0.106***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Spring season 0.192*** 0.207*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.150***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Summer season 0.001 0.004 0.017 0.015 0.017
(0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Flow capacity 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
2nd equivalent treatment 0.794*** 0.820*** 0.820** 0.807** 0.818**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.324) (0.323) (0.323)
Sales taxes ($1,000) 1.2E  6 2.4E  7 8.4E  7 2.2E  7 7.6E  7
(7.5E  7) (7.7E  7) (8.3E  7) (8.6E  7) (8.2E  7)
Population (millions) 0.165 0.365 1.528* 0.592 1.461*
(0.433) (0.447) (0.882) (0.910) (0.882)
Monthly effluent limit 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.025 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Permit expiration (1000 days) 0.233*** 0.255*** 0.136*** 0.152*** 0.137***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Final limit type 0.574*** 0.559*** 0.723*** 0.718*** 0.724***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
Nonreporting of effluent limit 0.051 0.051 0.033 0.033 0.033
(0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
KDHE/EPA 1-yr lagged penalty 0.115* 0.109* 0.1980*** 0.205*** 0.198***
(0.070) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Cumulative EPA inspections 0.008 0.012 0.031 0.030 0.031
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Cumulative KDHE inspections 0.035* 0.040** 0.040** 0.051*** 0.040**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Annual EPA enforcement 0.067*** N/A 0.040*** N/A 0.040***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Annual KDHE enforcement 0.019*** N/A 0.009** N/A 0.010**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Predicted EPA inspection 1.392* 2.550*** 1.932*** 1.477** 1.920***
(0.808) (0.857) (0.687) (0.747) (0.695)
Predicted KDHE inspection 0.849** 1.107*** 0.359 0.519* 0.362
(0.340) (0.344) (0.303) (0.311) (0.304)
1992 indicator N/A 0.124** N/A 0.087** N/A
(0.050) (0.038)
1993 indicator N/A 0.173*** N/A 0.139*** N/A
(0.050) (0.039)
1994 indicator N/A 0.238*** N/A 0.154** N/A
(0.052) (0.042)
1995 indicator N/A 0.253*** N/A 0.117** N/A
(0.056) (0.045)
1996 indicator N/A 0.312*** N/A 0.153*** N/A
(0.058) (0.048)
1997 indicator N/A 0.430*** N/A 0.239*** N/A
(0.062) (0.052)
1998 indicator N/A 0.628*** N/A 0.409*** N/A
(0.065) (0.056)
No. of Observations 3,840 3,840 3,840 3,840 3,840
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.139 0.116 0.123 0.113
Standard errors shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
N/A indicates that a particular regressor is not applicable to the noted model.
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Much of the subsequent analysis focuses on these two
factors when examining heterogeneity across individual
facilities.
The one-way random effects model dominates the pooled
OLS model according to a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test,
but the one-way fixed effects model dominates the random
effects model according to a Hausman test for random
effects.28 Therefore, I focus more on the fixed-effects model.
Table 2 reports the estimation results from the one-way
random-effects model. The results for factors involving
seasonal patterns, permit conditions, inspection-related spe-
cific deterrence, and enforcement-related general deterrence
are very similar to the pooled OLS results in sign and
statistical significance. Whereas the effect of treatment tech-
nology remains strongly significant, the effect of flow ca-
pacity reverses sign and becomes insignificant. The effect of
population becomes significantly positive, indicating that
greater pressure on a treatment system undermines perfor-
mance, as one might expect. Most important, the signifi-
cantly negative effects of the predicted EPA inspection
probability and the lagged penalty indicator evaporate. In-
stead, each of these government interventions generates a
positive effect. In the case of predicted state inspections, the
effect remains negative but becomes insignificant. (The
significance remains when individual year indicators are
included, as shown in column 4 of table 2; the other
coefficients are highly robust to this inclusion.) The inability
to link some deterrence factors to environmental perfor-
mance may stem from the disruption to another important
factor—flow capacity. The results of the fixed-effects model
buttress this conclusion.
Fixed-Effects Model: The one-way fixed-effects model
not only dominates the one-way random-effects model but
also the pooled OLS model. The F-test statistic of no fixed
effects (83.1) strongly rejects the absence of fixed effects.
Inclusion of these facility-specific factors dramatically in-
creases the adjusted R2 measure from 0.13 to 0.50. Thus,
heterogeneity across individual facilities is strongly evident,
and inclusion of facility-specific constant terms is definitely
warranted.
Table 3 reports the estimation results. The fixed-effects
model results for factors involving seasonal patterns, permit
conditions, inspection-related specific deterrence, and fed-
eral enforcement-related general deterrence are very similar
to the pooled OLS and random-effects model results in sign
and statistical significance. Yet, differences are noteworthy.
The effect of community resources becomes highly signif-
icant: as resources grow, performance improves. As in the
random-effects model results, greater population pressure
undermines performance. Most important, the significantly
negative effects of the predicted EPA inspection probability
and lagged penalty indicator again evaporate and become
28 The Hausman test statistic equals 20.5 and is significant at levels
below 5%.
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATION OF BOD RELATIVE EMISSIONS:
FIXED-EFFECTS MODELS
Variable
One-Way
Model 1a
One-Way
Model 2a
Two-Way
Modelb
Nonreporting of
emissions 0.169*** 0.179*** 0.175***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
Winter season 0.099*** 0.121*** N/A
(0.038) (0.039)
Spring season 0.148*** 0.156*** N/A
(0.028) (0.028)
Summer season 0.018 0.016 N/A
(0.026) (0.026)
Population (millions) 8.977*** 7.476*** 7.51***
(1.880) (2.107) (2.11)
Sales taxes ($1,000) 3.09 E  6*** 2.01 E  6* 2.04 E  6*
(9.66 E  7) (1.064 E  6) (1.07 E  6)
Monthly effluent limit 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Permit expiration (1,000
days) 0.123*** 0.143*** 0.142***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Final limit type 0.727*** 0.726*** 0.730***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Nonreporting of effluent
limit 0.033 0.033 0.035
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
KDHE/EPA 1-yr
lagged penalty 0.208*** 0.211*** 0.209***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Cumulative EPA
inspections 0.023 0.029 0.031
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Cumulative KDHE
inspections 0.037*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Annual EPA
enforcement 0.036*** N/A N/A
(0.007)
Annual KDHE
enforcement 0.005 N/A N/A
(0.004)
Predicted EPA
inspection 2.102*** 1.532** 1.601*
(0.687) (0.748) (0.861)
Predicted KDHE
inspection 0.235 0.435 0.351
(0.304) (0.312) (0.322)
1992 indicator N/A 0.082** N/A
(0.038)
1993 indicator N/A 0.108*** N/A
(0.040)
1994 indicator N/A 0.093** N/A
(0.045)
1995 indicator N/A 0.100** N/A
(0.045)
1996 indicator N/A 0.148*** N/A
(0.048)
1997 indicator N/A 0.226*** N/A
(0.052)
1998 indicator N/A 0.382*** N/A
(0.056)
Number of observations 3,840 3,840 3,840
Adjusted R2 0.5038 0.5069 0.5166
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
N/A indicates that a particular regressor is not applicable to the noted model.
a Regression also includes 40 facility-specific constant terms.
b Regression also includes 40 facility-specific constant terms and 95 month-specific constant terms.
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positive. The negative effect of predicted state inspections
becomes insignificant. Based on these results, I conclude
that the link between some deterrence factors and environ-
mental performance requires adequate control of facility
characteristics—flow capacity and treatment technology—
yet the facility-specific constant terms do not effectively
control for more systematic differences across facilities.29 In
sum, the one-way fixed-effects model generates odd results
for some deterrence factors and does not permit estimation
of key facility characteristics.30
Fortunately, the estimated facility-specific constant terms
may still provide useful information about the effects of
facility characteristics on performance. In particular, these
terms can be used to categorize facilities according to their
relative performance. As the benchmark for comparison, I
identify the median value of the 40 facility-specific intercept
terms. Given the even number of facilities, no estimated
intercept evenly divides the set of facilities. Instead, I
arbitrarily choose the facility with the 20th largest intercept
as the benchmark facility. Then I generate 39 facility-
specific indicator variables, based on that median facility.
By reestimating performance with this new set of regres-
sors, in lieu of 40 generic facility-specific intercepts, I am
able to categorize the facilities. The significance and signs
of the 39 facility-specific indicators identify which facilities
perform better, worse, or no different than the median
facility. Better performers have a significantly negative
indicator (15 facilities), worse performers have a statisti-
cally positive indicator (15 facilities), and neutral perform-
ers have an indicator insignificantly different from 0 (9
facilities). After categorizing each facility, I connect these
categories to the two facility characteristics: flow capacity
and treatment technology.
Flow capacity is a continuous variable ranging from 0.18
to 3.00 million gallons per day with a mean value of 6.30.
To discern its effect on performance, I divide the sample
into two subsamples using mean flow capacity: 26 smaller
facilities below the mean, and 13 larger facilities above the
mean.
Table 4 reports the cross-tabulations of capacity and
performance based on the sign of the facility-specific indi-
cator. Of the smaller-capacity facilities, most are worse
performers. Of the larger facilities, most are better perform-
ers. This simple comparison need not adequately discern the
link between capacity and performance. Instead, I evaluate
pairwise comparisons between the three categories of per-
formers: better versus neutral, better versus worse, and
neutral versus worse. Rather than using a two-sample t-test,
which requires normality, I use the Kruskall-Wallis non-
parametric test. As reported in table 4, an increase in
capacity increases the ratio of better to neutral performers,
the ratio of neutral to worse performers, and the ratio of
better to worse performers. These results indicate that in-
creased capacity shifts the distribution toward better perfor-
mance, that is, facilities face economies of scale with
respect to treatment performance. This conclusion is oppo-
site from the one generated by the pooled OLS model. Thus,
the use of panel data models proves critical for interpreting
the effect of facility size on performance.
Next, I link the type of treatment technology and envi-
ronmental performance based on the sign of the facility-
specific constant term. A cross-tabulation of treatment type
and performance category, shown in table 4, easily demon-
strates that all facilities using secondary equivalent treat-
ment are worse performers. (Kruskall-Wallis tests confirm
29 As further evidence, I reestimate the pooled OLS model without flow
capacity and treatment technology. Exclusion of these critical factors
disrupts the link between the same deterrence factors and performance in
a fashion similar to the disruption prompted by their exclusion in the
fixed-effects model.
30 As in the pooled OLS model, I revised the one-way fixed effects
model by adding individual year indicators, while excluding enforcement-
related general deterrence. As shown in table 3, the two sets of estimates—
model 1 and model 2—are highly similar in coefficient signs, magnitudes,
and significance.
TABLE 4.—EFFECT OF FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS ON CATEGORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE, ACCORDING TO THE SIGN
AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FACILITY-SPECIFIC INDICATORS
FROM THE ONE-WAY FIXED-EFFECTS MODEL
A. Treatment Type
i. Frequency Distribution of Performer Category by Treatment Type
Treatment type
Performer Categorya
Better Neutral Worse
Secondary 15 9 12
Secondary equivalent 0 0 3
ii. Pairwise Comparison of Performer Category:
Sample Division according to Treatment Type
Pairwise Comparison of
Performer Category
Kruskal-Wallis Nonparametric
Test
Test Statistic p-Value
Better vs. neutral N/A N/A
Better vs. worse 359.9 0.01
Neutral vs. worse 222.1 0.01
B. Flow Capacity
i. Frequency Distribution of Performer Category by Flow Capacity
Type
Flow Capacity Type
Performer Categorya
Better Neutral Worse
Smaller than averageb 8 6 12
Larger than averageb 7 3 3
ii. Pairwise Comparison of Performer Category:
Sample Division According to Flow Capacity
Pairwise Comparison of
Performer Category
Kruskal-Wallis Nonparametric
Test
Test Statistic p-Value
Better vs. neutral 44.4 0.01
Better vs. worse 259.1 0.01
Neutral vs. worse 57.6 0.01
a Relative to median facility, better performers (that is, facilities) possess a significantly negative
indicator, worse performers possess a statistically positive indicator, and neutral performers possess an
indicator insignificantly different from 0.
b Average flow capacity is 6.30 million gallons per day.
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this point.) This conclusion is consistent with the strongly
significant result generated by the pooled OLS model.
D. Two-Way Panel Data Models
Having examined heterogeneity across facilities using
one-way panel data models, I next examine heterogeneity
across time periods using the two-way random-effects and
fixed-effects models. As shown in table 2, the estimation
results of the two-way random-effects model are highly
similar to those of the one-way random-effects model. Thus,
inclusion of time-specific factors does not significantly alter
the previous conclusions. Lastly, I employ the two-way
fixed-effects model, which estimates numerous individual
month coefficients. Over one-third of these time-specific
coefficients are significant. The appropriate F-test for joint
significance of all the fixed effects—facility-specific and
time-specific—confirms their importance at levels much
below 1% (statistic equals 10.15).31 Thus, the two-way
fixed-effects model dominates the comparable pooled OLS
model.32 Nevertheless, the two-way fixed effects model
results differ little from the one-way fixed-effects model
results. Thus, the previous conclusions are robust to the
presence of strong heterogeneity across individual time
periods.
V. Summary
This paper analyzes the regulatory factors—inspections,
penalties, permit conditions—shaping environmental per-
formance by examining wastewater discharges from large
Kansas municipal facilities between 1990 and 1998. To
exploit the data set’s panel structure, I employ pooled OLS
and four panel data models: one-way and two-way random-
effects models and one-way and two-way fixed-effects
models.
First, I evaluate the robustness across these models using
OLS as the reference point. Inspection- and enforcement-
related specific and general deterrence significantly induce
better performance. Lax permit conditions significantly un-
dermine environmental performance. Incorporation of
facility-specific factors disrupts only the link between two
specific deterrence factors and performance.
Second, I analyze the heterogeneity across individual
facilities. This analysis relates to key facility characteristics
whose systematic control apparently proves critical for
measuring the influence of certain deterrence factors. For-
tunately, analysis of facility-specific indicators permits eval-
uation of facility-characteristic effects: facilities face econ-
omies of scale with respect to flow capacity, and facilities
using secondary-equivalent treatment underperform their
peers. Because the first conclusion is inconsistent with the
pooled OLS results, panel data analysis proves important on
this point.
Lastly, I evaluate heterogeneity across time periods. Even
though strong time effects exist, the presence of time-
specific factors does not alter the conclusions drawn from
one-way panel data models.
Though interesting, these conclusions are based on a very
limited data set.
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APPENDIX
Predicted Probability of Government Interventions
This appendix separately estimates the probability of each government
intervention decision. To estimate the probability of an EPA inspection
and a KDHE inspection, I employ a probit model using these regressors:
(1) a preceding 12-month cumulative count of KDHE inspections at a
specific facility; (2) a preceding 12-month cumulative count of EPA
inspections at a specific facility; (3) a 1-year lagged indicator of EPA
and/or KDHE penalty; (4) the mean value of relative emissions in the
preceding three-month period; (5) facility characteristics: (a) flow capac-
ity, (b) type of treatment technology; (6) water conditions: (a) ambient
water quality of receiving waterbody, (b) seasonal indicators, (c) time
trend; (7) community factors: (a) population, (b) sales taxes per capita, (c)
high school graduation rate, (d) Republican presidential vote in 1996, and
(e) unemployment rate. (Details on the rationale for selecting these
regressors and complete estimation results are available upon request.) If
the predicted inspection probabilities were used within a simultaneous
equation system, the following regressors would help to identify the
system, because they are excluded from the performance equation: rela-
tive emissions in preceding 3-month period, ambient water quality, high
school graduation rate, Republican presidential vote, and unemployment
rate. (The time trend is similar to individual year indicators or the
time-specific factors of the two-way fixed-effects model.) For the EPA
inspection equation, none of these excluded factors, except time trend, are
significant. Nevertheless, the nonlinearity of the normal distribution func-
tion is sufficient to identify the system regarding EPA inspections (Greene,
1997). For the KDHE inspection equation, preceding relative emissions,
ambient water quality, and Republican vote are significant.
The estimation results indicate an excellent fit for each type of
inspection. As one measure of goodness of fit, the Pearson 2 test statistics
of 4,483 and 3,971, respectively, for the EPA inspection and KDHE
inspection equations are both significant at the 1% level given 3,805
degrees of freedom.
To estimate the government decision to take either a federal or state
enforcement action, I first aggregate the data to an annual level, because
the dependent variable is recorded only on an annual basis. I employ a
probit model and use the same explanatory variables as for the inspection
equations. Estimation results indicate a very poor fit (the Pearson 2 test
statistic of 241 is significant only at levels greater than 90% given 309
degrees of freedom), which is not surprising, given the limited number of
enforcement actions. Use of this predicted probability in the estimation of
performance generates coefficients of implausible sign and significance.
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